Policymakers have increasingly implemented nutritional taxes to influence con-
sumer behavior toward healthier diets. While theoretical and empirical litera-
ture suggests that taxes should be proportional to the harm caused, most taxes
implemented to date, including sugar taxes, feature tiered rather than linear de-
signs. This discrepancy between theory and practice raises the central question:
can tiered sugar taxes, under imperfect competition and market power, be welfare-
optimal, and if so, how should their structure be designed? In this paper, we eval-
uate the economic performance of tiered sugar tax designs compared to the theo-
retically optimal linear tax. Using a welfare maximization framework, we account
for externalities from excess sugar consumption, heterogeneous consumption pat-
terns, and firms’ strategic pricing behavior. Our findings reveal that tiered tax de-
signs, when incorporating strategic responses from firms, can lead to significantly
greater welfare improvements than linear taxation or the implemented Soft Drinks
Industry Levy in the UK. Specifically, the optimal design features higher taxes on
high-sugar products, prompting firms to reduce prices on lower-sugar alternatives.
This adjustment not only enhances public health outcomes but also increases con-
sumer surplus and preserves firm profitability. These results suggest that tiered
sugar taxes can serve as welfare-enhancing policy tools when designed to reflect
both consumer heterogeneity and market competition.