Policymakers have increasingly implemented nutritional taxes to influence consumer behavior toward healthier diets, with the efficiency of these taxes largely depending on their design. While theoretical and empirical literature suggests that taxes should be proportional to the harm caused, most nutritional taxes implemented to date, including sugar taxes, feature tiered rather than linear designs. This inconsistency between theory and practice raises the question: can tiered taxes be optimal, and if so, how should their key components be set? In this paper, we evaluate the performance of tiered sugar tax designs compared to the theoretically optimal linear tax. Using a welfare maximization framework, we account for externalities from excess sugar consumption, heterogeneous consumption patterns, and firms' strategic pricing behavior. Our findings reveal that tiered tax designs, when incorporating strategic responses from firms, can lead to significantly greater welfare improvements than the implemented Soft Drinks Industry Levy in the UK. Specifically, the optimal design features higher taxes on high-sugar products, prompting firms to reduce prices on lower-sugar alternatives. This adjustment not only enhances public health outcomes but also increases consumer surplus and preserves firm profitability. These results suggest that policymakers should carefully account for firms' strategic behavior when designing sugar taxation policies to maximize welfare benefits.